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Introduction
The design of policies towards countries where major conflicts have ended is becoming a major issue in the development agenda partly because of the numbers of countries where such policy is relevant and partly because their situation tends to be among the most desperate. Today, for example, we have the Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Congo nearing the post-conflict stage, adding to the conflicts that ended with the end of the cold war, such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Angola. As is apparent from this list not all the conflicts have ended completely, and there is always a danger of recurrence. 1 In designing policy, therefore, it is essential to address the main factors that led to the conflict in the first place, as well as the more obvious requirements of demobilization, reconstructing the infrastructure and re-establishing conditions for economic growth.
This paper is concerned with one major requirement in reconstruction policies that is often overlooked: that is to design policies which will reduce the horizontal inequalities (HIs) which are often a major source of conflict. If they do not, and HIs are an important element behind mobilization for conflict, there will be a danger of renewed mobilization around them and a further outbreak of violence. The paper reviews the range of policies which would contribute to reducing HIs; it also considers some political issues surrounding such policies, including potential political risks which can arise in adopting these types of policy.
There are many economic and political causes of violent conflict-low incomes, high unemployment, and competition for resources, human rights abuses, etc.-some associated with horizontal inequalities, some not. Before appropriate reconstruction policies can be designed it is essential to understand the deep-rooted reasons for the conflict, which in many cases will go beyond HIs, and in some cases may not involve HIs at all. Thus the policies aimed at reducing HIs are not the only policies needed postconflict, and are not invariably relevant. The policies to be discussed below are relevant to situations where HIs are large and have been a significant factor underlying the conflict.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will explore how HIs can contribute to conflict. On the basis of this analysis section 3 will consider the types of policies likely to reduce HIs. Section 4 will analyse how some of these policies have worked in practice, some successes and some problems. In section 5, we then consider how far such policies are currently incorporated in the reconstruction policy agenda, both on the basis of some general pronouncements and two examples-Mozambique and Guatemala. Section 6 will conclude.
Causes of conflict: the role of HIs
Horizontal inequalities are inequalities among groups with shared identities-identities formed by religion, ethnic ties or racial affiliations, or other salient ways that bind groups of people together. While many conflicts have a cultural dimension, i.e. the groups that fight perceive themselves as belonging to a common culture (ethnicity or religion) and are partly fighting for cultural autonomy, it is evident that cultural differences are not a sufficient explanation for conflict since many multicultural societies live together relatively peacefully, while others do so for decades and then conflict erupts. Indeed, Fearon and Laitin have estimated that from 1960-79 of all the potential ethnic conflicts in Africa (defined as occurring where different ethnic groups live side-by-side) only 0.01 per cent actually turned into conflict. We need, therefore, to go beyond cultural explanations of conflict to economic and political explanations. As Abner Cohen (1974: 94) argued:
Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do … fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both.
That is, cultural differences do not lead to violent conflict unless there are also major economic and/or political causes. The motivation of the participants is clearly at the heart of the roots of any violent situation. Many contemporary economists emphasize the pursuit of individual economic advantage as the prime force. But the majority of internal conflicts are organized group conflicts, not exclusively, or mainly, a matter of individuals committing random violence against others. What is involved is group mobilization with people with some shared identity or goals attacking others, in the name of the group. While young men may fight because they are unemployed and uneducated and have few other opportunities, they also generally fight out of loyalty to a group (sometimes an ideology or a cause) , like the militia in Najaf, the Hutus in Rwanda, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Catholics in Northern Ireland and so on. Sometimes, indeed, the power of their beliefs or loyalties are so high that they are prepared to sacrifice their own interests-in the extreme including their lives-for the wider objectives of the group. Often governments are involved, dominated by one or other identity group, sometimes instigating attacks against other groups, sometimes being attacked. 2 In fact Holsti argues that state violence has more often than not been the initiating cause in recent conflicts (Holsti 2000) .
In contemporary conflicts, group affiliations occur along a variety of different lines. In some, it is religious affiliation that provides the relevant binding and categorising identity (Northern Ireland; Moslems/Hindus in India, the Philippines, for example); in some it seems to be racial (Fiji; Darfur) ; in some it is ethnicity (Rwanda; North East India); in some clans are the main source of affiliation (e.g., Somalia) and in many there are overlapping distinctions, for example both ethnic and religious affiliations (as in Jos in Nigeria; and the Balkans), while class and ethnicity overlap in Central America and caste and ethnicity in Nepal. The salience of such identities for political purposes develops either where leaders choose to emphasize group difference for mobilization for political ends (for example, the Malaysian government choosing to emphasize Bumiputera identity; or indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia) and/or the group is picked out by others for discrimination and sometimes physical violence (for example, the Jews throughout history; the Chinese in South East Asia; Northerners in Côte d'Ivoire).
Though group boundaries are generally indeterminate and people have multiple and fluid identities, leaders are able to emphasize (or even create) particular affiliations and call on these identities in mobilizing supporters. However, effective large scale group mobilization-particularly for violent actions-generally requires a basis in serious group grievances and ambitions. For leaders of such groups the main motivation may be political ambition; while followers, who also are concerned with their political representation, may be primarily motivated by grievance about the economic and social position of the group relative to others. Both leaders and followers may become strongly motivated where there are severe and consistent economic, social and political differences between culturally defined groups, or multidimensional HIs. It should be noted that it is not necessarily the relatively deprived who instigate violence. The privileged may do so, fearing loss of position. The prospect of possible loss of political power can act as a powerful motive for state-sponsored violence which occurs with the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power.
For simplification, we can categorize HIs into four areas: political participation; economic assets; incomes and employment; and social aspects. Each of these contain a number of elements. For example, political participation can occur at the level of the cabinet, the bureaucracy, the army and so on; economic assets comprise land, livestock, human capital etc. The four categories and the main elements are presented HIs may be spatially distributed-i.e., particular regions of a country are deprived (or privileged). In this case, HIs can lead to separatist claims-sometimes richer provinces seek separatism, not wanting to share their wealth (e.g., Biafra in Nigeria, or Aceh in Indonesia), and sometimes it is poorer regions, who feel exploited by the richer areas (e.g., Bangladesh and Eritrea). Different types of conflict emerge, however, where people from salient groups live in the same geographic area. In such cases, the deprived may seek political and economic rights or control over governmental institutions, or there can be attacks among groups without direct government involvement and pressure for ethnic cleansing. Appropriate policies differ in these different situations.
It is important to recognize that the normal economic policy package of liberalization and market forces is not generally sufficient to reduce HIs, or even to prevent them widening, while democratic institutions are often not sufficient to prevent horizontal inequalities arising on the political dimension. As far as economic HIs are concerned, this is because long-lasting privilege among some groups relative to others, puts them in a stronger position (with better education, more capital, etc.) to exploit the market. As far as political HIs are concerned, majoritarian democracies can discriminate against minorities, while even with 'shared' power at the top, inequalities may persist at lower levels. Inequalities in political power often lead to similar inequalities in economic and social dimensions. Biased distribution of government jobs, infrastructure and so on is common, with the group in power discriminating in its favour. For example, in Burundi in the 1990s, half of government investment went to Bujumbura and its vicinity, home of the elite Tutsi (Gaffney 2000). In some countries, the President and his coterie take a massive share of state resources for their private use-as, for example, the Duvaliers in Haiti and the Somoza family in Nicaragua (Lundahl 2000; Pastor and Boyce 2000) . Research to date 3 suggests that HIs are more likely to provoke conflict when:
− They are durable (Tilly 1998 HIs are not, of course, the sole source of conflict. 5 Other economic explanations of conflict include private incentives, arising particularly in the presence of natural resources where war provides opportunities of enrichment; individual grievances of various kind, particularly associated with low incomes, and high levels of poverty and unemployment; environmental pressures leading to conflicts over resources, especially land; and failure of the social contract to deliver public services, security and incomes. Each of these explanations has some statistical and case study support. Different conflicts have different explanations, while more than one hypothesis often appears to be relevant. For example, the north/south conflict in the Sudan was both an example of horizontal inequality (with the south being heavily deprived), and one of powerful private gains which perpetuated the struggle (Keen 1994) . While environmental poverty has plausibly been argued to be a significant element in the conflict in Rwanda (André and Platteau 1996) , horizontal inequalities were clearly also important.
Where HIs are a primary factor behind conflict, it is important to identify which of the many elements in HIs were critical. Hence one cannot devise a one size fits all solution.
What one can do is to develop a general approach-to investigate and assess major HIs in all the three main dimensions, and then to develop suitable policies. Our research to date suggests that economic and social HIs represent a predisposing condition, such that deprived groups have strong grievances, but the simultaneous presence of major political HIs makes violent conflict much more likely. 6 Consequently, policies must address political as well as economic/social HIs. The next section will review the sort of policies which would reduce HIs, with some examples of places where they have been applied. We look first at policies towards economic/social HIs and then at policies towards political HIs.
Policies towards HIs
Policies towards correcting HIs can be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. This is action taken towards the allocation of political and/or economic entitlements on the basis of membership of specific groups, for the purpose of increasing the specified groups' share of entitlements. The action generally covers the public sector and sometimes extends to private sector activity. Such action is directed at relatively disadvantaged groups. Similar action designed to improve the position of privileged groups (e.g., under apartheid) would be described as exclusionary rather than affirmative.
In devising policies, the first requirement is careful diagnosis to identify whether HIs were indeed a factor in the conflict, and which elements were particularly salient. It is essential, therefore, to gather data on groups' position, with respect to the major economic and political dimensions outlined above. In practice, data of this type is relatively rare except in countries where the importance of HIs is acknowledged and policies are being adopted towards them, such as in Malaysia or South Africa. In many cases, proxies will have to be used (geographic data is the most obvious proxy in cases where the groups are geographically located, but this, of course, won't help where there is geographic mixing). One important consideration is to avoid a situation in which the policies devised to correct HIs become a source of conflict as they arguably did in Sri Lanka. This issue will be discussed in the concluding section. Here I separate economic/social and political action towards HIs.
Economic and social policies towards HIs
Here the objective is to reduce economic and social HIs. But it is not always straightforward to decide what this means. For example: should one aim for equality of opportunities, of resource access or of outcomes? In the first case one would aim for 'an even playing field', i.e. that everyone faces the same opportunities, or there is no group discrimination. But this is not simple to define since groups with deep disadvantages which have accumulated over time are unable to use opportunities with the same efficiency and outcomes: for example, without any overt discrimination, the children of long-term privileged groups will do better in any competitive examinations, and so on.
Moreover, disadvantage has many aspects, some of which are quite hidden, e.g., job advertisements may be in newspapers which in principle are open to all but in practice are widely read by one group rather than another. Social networks and information about education, jobs, economic opportunities are often strongly group related, so what seems like a 'level playing field' is not. All sorts of implicit practices and job requirements (e.g., on language, time and place for job applications and so on) may favour one group against another. Therefore, the liberal philosophy of 'equal opportunities' is at best a necessary condition for advancing group equality. Another way of looking at this is to say that in addition to eliminating overt discrimination there is much implicit discrimination that must be addressed.
Equality of resource access-interpreted as equality of actual resource distribution, not 'opportunities'-is likely to get nearer to providing a genuine level playing field. This may still result in inequalities of outcomes, defined very broadly in terms of health, income per capita and educational achievements, 7 because the disadvantaged group is likely to be less efficient at using a particular set of assets in part because some assets are difficult to target, especially in the short-run, and are likely to remain unequal, such as features associated with upbringing, social capital etc. Hence for equality of outcomes one may need inequality in access to targetable assets, such as education, land, and capital. However, in most contexts large HIs prevail and as a first step achieving greater equality of actual asset access would represent important progress. Further policies to achieve equality of outcomes can follow in later years if asset equality has been achieved and inequality of outcomes persists.
One can distinguish three types of policy which may be adopted to achieve greater group equality in economic entitlements (although the distinctions are not watertight). First, one can change policies towards processes which are directly or indirectly discriminatory. Second, one can direct assistance to particular groups, e.g., training people for interviews, subsidising housing. Third, one can introduce targets and quotas for education, land distribution, financial and physical assets etc. The first type of policy is not so different from any set of policies to promote competition-although it involves a much more careful search for indirectly discriminatory policies than is usual. It is likely to be the most acceptable type of policy and can have a significant impact (this was a major part of the policy set adopted in Northern Ireland, see below). However, post-conflict reconstruction generally requires immediate action and impact, while process reform takes a while to have a significant impact. The second type of policy concerns the nature and distribution of public expenditure, often involving a redirection of expenditure across regions, or even neighbourhoods, as well as groups within them, and is in principle in the control of the government, but it may meet resistance from privileged areas or from the government itself representing privileged groups. This type of policy requires careful review of the implications of all public expenditure (and other relevant policies) for group distribution of benefits. It is noteworthy that this does not form an explicit consideration in the public expenditure reviews supported by the international donors, or that of most governments. The third type of policy (quotas, etc.) is most controversial and politically provocative. The third type is what many people mean when they talk of 'affirmative action' though affirmative action can be interpreted as including all three types of policy.
Where a major source of HIs is the public sector (education, employment, infrastructure) a good deal can be achieved through direct action by the government, if it wants to reduce HIs. HIs located in the private sector are more difficult to tackle, though all three types of policy will make a contribution.
Despite the fact that affirmative action (especially of the third type) smacks of government intervention and would, therefore, be against the spirit of the pro-market liberalization that dominates current policy making, there are many cases where it has been adopted in one way or another. These cases are instructive both for pointing to the variety of policies possible and some of their effects. Appendix Table A .1 summarizes a review of affirmative action in economic and social policies around the world showing how pervasive it is (see Appendix Table A1 ). The focus on the review was the third type (quotas, etc.) because these are most overt, although examples of other types were included. Such policies have been adopted both in the North (the USA, New Zealand, Northern Ireland) and the South (e.g., Fiji, India, Malaysia, South Africa and Sri Lanka).
The programmes reviewed are of two sorts: those introduced by disadvantaged majorities (e.g., Fiji, Malaysia, Namibia, South Africa and Sri Lanka) and those introduced by advantaged majorities for disadvantaged minorities (e.g., Brazil, India, Northern Ireland and the USA). The review of affirmative action, which I would not claim to be comprehensive, but does cover many examples, points to the range of potential policies for correcting HIs. They include policies towards: 
Malaysia: a successful case of reducing economic and social HIs
As is now well-known, in 1971, following anti-Chinese riots, the New Economic Policy was introduced, with the aim of securing national unity by a two prong approach: 'to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty'; and 'to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function' (Second Malaysian Plan 1971-75) .
A variety of anti-poverty policies were adopted including policies to promote rural development and extend social services. As far as restructuring was concerned, the most significant policies:
− Aimed to expand Bumiputera share of capital ownership to 30 per cent.
− Aimed to settle 95 per cent of new lands on Malays.
− Introduced educational quotas for public institutions laid down, in line with population shares.
− Introduced credit policies which favoured Malays, with credit allocations and more favourable interest rates.
As Figures 1 and 2 and Table 2 show, the policies were effective in reducing the differentials, but not in eliminating them. The application of the policies was much weakened from the mid-1980s, and since then there has been little progress in changing HIs, except in professional employment which may reflect earlier educational policies. Efficiency does not seem to have been adversely affected, since economic growth was rapid over this period. Evidence suggests that intra-group inequality did not increase during the NEP, but actually lessened, with the Gini for Malay incomes (peninsular) falling from 0.488 in 1979 to 0.428 in 1988, while the Gini for Chinese incomes fell from 0.470 to 0.400 over the same period. The distribution of Indian incomes also became more equal (Hashim 1997). The political objective does seem to have been achieved, as no serious anti-Chinese riots have occurred since 1969, even in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis while there were serious anti-Chinese violence elsewhere (Indonesia and Thailand). From a political perspective, the Chinese were represented in government via the alliance (UMNO) which has ruled Malaysia since 1955. However, most observers would concur that they had limited political power. Though widely criticized, the policies were accepted by the Chinese community probably because of the considerable economic opportunities they enjoyed, with rapidly growing incomes and continued differentials in their favour. The policies have also been criticized for leaving out the Indian community-although on average, they retained favourable differentials-and for the fact that the Bumiputera policy (sons of the soil) mainly favoured Peninsular Malays and not indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak, such as the Orangi Asli.
Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, HIs have been large and persistent over all dimensions over a very long time period-indeed essentially since English Protestants first colonized Ireland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These sharp HIs-economic, social and politicalwere an important factor behind the outbreak of violence in the 1970s. From the late 1970s the British government and the European Union initiated policies to correct these inequalities. The success of these policies was probably one factor explaining why the Catholic community was prepared to stop violent action.
By the end of the nineteenth century Protestants controlled the vast bulk of the economic resources of east Ulster-the best of its land, its industrial and financial capital, commercial and business networks, industrial skills (Ruane and Todd 1996: 151) . The division of the island, when the Republic of Ireland was created in 1922, ensured permanent political control and continued economic dominance by the Protestants in the province of Northern Ireland, where they formed the majority. Assessments indicate no narrowing of the gap between the communities from 1901 to 1951, with Catholics disadvantaged at every level (Hepburn 1983) . Unemployment rates, for example, were consistently more than twice the rate among Catholics than Protestants; educational qualifications were substantially worse. In fact, there was some worsening of the Catholic position over the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, with a rising proportion of unskilled workers among Catholics and a falling proportion among Protestants and the relative unemployment ratios also appear to have worsened over this period (Ruane et al. 1996) .
Political inequalities were also large. For example, the Catholics with roughly 40 per cent of the population accounted for only 8 per cent of the membership of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), while devolution of power to the province meant that the majority Protestants were in permanent control. The consistency of the inequalities across political, economic and social dimensions-with most evidence suggesting little change in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century-provided fertile ground for the outbreak of the 'troubles' in the late 1960s.
From the late 1970s, the British government introduced a series of measures that worked to reduce economic and social HIs. The introduction of two Fair Employment Acts in 1976 and 1989 greatly reduced employment discrimination; and housing and education policy was geared to reduce differentials. The policies had a significant impact on His (see Figures 3, 4 , and 5). Inequality in access to higher education was eliminated by the 1990s; inequality in incomes was reduced; the housing inequality was significantly reduced; and the employment profile and unemployment rates became more equal; even the imbalance in recruitment to the RUC was slowly being reversed. According to one observer 'It is unusual to find such a rate of social change within a generation. It is quite dramatic. 1971, 1981, 1991 The Good Friday Agreement embodied measures to correct political inequalities, such as power sharing and reform of the police to incorporate more Catholics. 
Correcting social and economic HIs-a summary
The survey of affirmative action shows that it often has some success in reducing HIs, but has rarely totally eliminated gaps-although in a few cases (e.g., Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka; see below) selected gaps were even reversed. Moreover, there is no evidence that the policies reduce efficiency, though careful evaluations are rare. In theory, there are reasons for expecting the efficiency impacts to have both negative and positive elements. On the negative side, there is the interference in normal competitive processes which might prevent resources being allocated according to their most efficient use; but on the positive side is the offset (or reduction) in discrimination which itself contributes to inefficient resource allocation, and should allow the greater exploitation of potential. The most systematic study of the efficiency impact has been with respect to US affirmative action towards blacks. Some studies show positive impact, while none show negative. 8 In Malaysia, the high economic growth that accompanied the policies also suggest that the policies are highly unlikely to have had any substantial negative efficiency impact, and may have had positive impact. 
Indonesia Malaysia
It has been argued that while the policies reduce inter-group inequality they increase intra-group inequality. From an a priori perspective, this is not inevitable but depends on whether the policies mostly extend lower-income opportunities and services (e.g., unskilled employment; investment in poor regions; primary education) or mostly affect upper-income opportunities (professional and skilled employment; higher education). Systematic evidence on this is lacking. In the case of Malaysia, intra-group inequality fell during the decade when the policies were most effective. In South Africa, it is argued that intra-black inequality has risen since the policies were reduced. In both cases, of course, many other influences were simultaneously affecting income distribution (e.g., the anti-poverty policies in Malaysia; and the liberalization policies in South Africa) so the changes cannot be attributed to the affirmative policies alone.
The possibility of adverse impact on efficiency and intra-group equity suggests that one should aim to design policies which tend by themselves (or in conjunction with other policies) to enhance efficiency and to improve income distribution. From an efficiency perspective, this might mean a greater emphasis on process reform and subsidies than quotas; and from an equity perspective, it would mean putting emphasis on employment and basic services, and infrastructure in poor regions.
It should also be noted that even if the policies did reduce efficiency and worsen intragroup income distribution, these effects would need to be weighed against their likely impact in reducing violence, which itself would have positive effect on growth and efficiency and poverty reduction. From this perspective a comparison of Malaysia's post-1997 record with that of Indonesia is suggestive. Both suffered a similar economic shock, which was followed by a period of quite serious violence in the case of Indonesia. While Malaysia's growth was slightly positive, taking the whole period 1997 to 2003 (Figure 6 ) Indonesia's growth rate was negative, on average, (GDP per capita falling by 5.3 per cent over the period).
Political action
Ensuring that each major group participates in political power is a critical requirement for sustained peace, since political exclusion is likely to generate the leadership which is essential for mobilization. Hence action is needed to reduce political HIs and to ensure that each group participates in political decision-making and power. Where one group dominates numerically in the population (e.g., in Sri Lanka; Northern Ireland; Rwanda), a Westminster majoritarian political system plus winner takes all ensures that minorities are excluded politically. Power sharing is not a natural consequence of the way many understand democracy.
It should be emphasized that political participation can occur at many levels (central, regional, local), in different types of decision (defence, economic, social) and in different activities (army, police, civil service). Full political participation means that significant groups in the population participate across the board, and that their presence is not just nominal. There are many ways this can be promoted. Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3 review a range of such policies which have been introduced in divided societies. Here we touch briefly on major aspects.
-A federal constitution: Where groups are mainly geographically separate a federal constitution can empower different groups. Nigeria is an example. The Nigerian case also shows that the design of the federation is also an important factor, as the initial three-state constitution encouraged Biafran separatism. After the civil war the Federation was redesigned to encompass more states which straddled different ethnicities.
-
The extent and nature of decentralization: This can contribute to power sharing in a similar way to federalism. This may have been one reason why Bolivia avoided conflict despite deep HIs. But it does not always work in the intended way. Decentralization can replace one set of power brokers by another, which may or may not diffuse group domination. For example, in a study in Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, mayoral election in Medan was achieved with the support of a group of 'toughs'. The poor were not empowered: 'land rights activists argue that local governments which are supposed to be accountable to local peoples have done little to resolve long standing land tenure disputes involving the peasantry; labour activists suggest that party linked militia have been involved in terrorising workers during labour disputes, while in the pay of local industrialists' (Vedi Hadiz 2004: 715) . Where groups are geographically concentrated, such decentralization may nonetheless give greater political power to previously underrepresented groups. But it can also lead to continued (or even greater) disempowerment for some (normally minority) groups within the decentralized areas, as is also the case with federalism (cf. Nigeria).
The voting system: A proportional representation system gives more power to minorities, but even with proportional representation a majority can dominate decision-making unless one also adopts a power-sharing system in elected assemblies and government. Other voting systems (such as the alternative vote) can be designed to improve group representation. Such systems are rare in developing countries, although it is worth reporting that no country with proportional representation has had serious conflict.
The nature of the elected assemblies: In a two-house, assembly, its possible to combine democratic representation in one house of the assembly with geographic (as in US) or group representation in the other. The voting system within assemblies can be designed to prevent a single group dominating (e.g., requiring a two-thirds majority), or veto powers.
Seat reservation for particular groups: This has been adopted for the unscheduled castes and tribes in India (and in a number of cases for women).
Job allocation within government: For example, there is provision for three presidents in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There can be formal or informal provisions for a fair share of political posts at every level: (i) presidential; (ii) cabinet; (iii) senior civil service; (iv) military, and (v) police.
Citizenship rights: These can be comprehensive covering all who live in an area, or highly restrictive, requiring several generations of residence, or extending only to 'blood' ties with some 'original' inhabitants. By excluding people from citizenship rights they may also be excluded from voting, or participation in government (as in Cote d'Ivoire).
The nature of political parties: If unconstrained, political parties tend to become 'ethnic' in divided societies (Horowitz 1985) . For this reason, multiparty elections often provoke violence (Snyder 2000; Stewart and O'Sullivan 1999) . Policies towards political parties range from outlawing them altogether (as in Museveni's Uganda) to requiring them to have multiethnic support (e.g., in Nigeria).
Human rights protection: Strong protection of civil liberties and human rights does not ensure power-sharing. But it does limit the abuse of power. It obviously has an important role to play.
This account has only touched on the many policies that can be used to ensure political participation of major groups. As with economic and social policies, there has been considerable experience in designing political systems to achieve inclusive and balanced political participation in sharply divided societies struggling to maintain peace and cohesion. Among developed countries, Belgium and Switzerland are prime examples. Many developing countries initially overcame these problems by one-party authoritarian regimes which suppressed dissent. But the political issues associated with multiethnic societies are coming to the fore with democratization. The recommended formula of majoritarian multiparty democracy is not adequate and post-conflict countries have struggled to find alternative more inclusive models. Nigeria, Fiji, Ethiopia and Malaysia are examples, each having modified their political systems as a consequence of political unrest. It is clear that policies to address political HIs need to accompany economic and social policies in post-conflict situations if renewed conflict is to be avoided.
Cultural policies
Cultural policies can be an important aspect of group grievances and consequently of post-conflict policies-such policies aim to correct cultural exclusion and discrimination (e.g., policies towards language, religious ceremonies, religious or ethnic dress, national holidays and so on. Language has been a critical issue in many countries, including Sri Lanka and among the Kurds in Iraq. Ceremonies and symbols are also important, at least as triggers for conflict: the Orange parades in Northern Ireland and the site of religious buildings in India and Israel/Palestine are among many examples. Dimitrijevics (2004) argues that in peace negotiations policies towards such cultural aspects have been more important for promoting peace than either political or economic policies.
Do current reconstruction policies include policies towards HIs?
At a general level, it seems that concern with correcting HIs is not part of the policy mix advocated by major donors. On the economic side, reconstruction policies have been mainly addressed towards restoring the infrastructure and (re)establishing a market economy, including the introduction of the normal package of liberal market reforms. On the political side, the emphasis has been on multi-party democracy and the 'usual' governance reforms, i.e. improved transparency and accountability.
... [the] peace building 'template' has come to include concrete programs and projects such as civil society promotion, multi-party elections, constitutionalism, rule of law and minority rights, gender equality, good governance through transparency and accountability, economic liberalization, and security sector reform'. Tschirgi (2004: 14) 9 The World Bank Report, Breaking the Conflict Trap, argues that in general appropriate policy should be different in post-conflict countries from normal peacetime policies. In particular the Report argues for policies to help post-conflict countries sustain growth, to offset the impact of commodity price slumps, to increase transparency in natural resource rich economies, and to limit access to resources which finance conflict. It does not consider any policies towards HIs. Actual practice in post-conflict reconstruction is more telling than broad prescriptions. 10 To assess this, I investigate two casesMozambique and Guatemala-where HIs seem to have been an important factor behind the conflict.
Reconstruction and HIs in Mozambique and Guatemala

Mozambique
Mozambique suffered a bitter civil war following independence. Although the war was ideological and geo-political with the socialist Frelimo government being attacked by the more conservative forces of Renamo with strong support from South Africa and some from the US, there were underlying regional and ethnic differences between the parties. There were also systematic inherited horizontal inequalities between these ethnicities/regions and the conflict was almost certainly partly due to the relative deprivation in the areas represented by Frelimo.
More than ten years have followed since the 1992 peace agreement and several multiparty elections. Reconstruction efforts received strong international support, which were rather successful from the perspective of growth and poverty reduction (albeit interrupted by natural disasters, including floods and drought). Yet the policies in no way addressed the underlying horizontal inequalities, which have persisted. The case illustrates how existing approaches to reconstruction often fail to incorporate an HI dimension into their thinking. Continued neglect of HIs may again undermine political stability. A fierce internal conflict between Frelimo and Renamo followed after Mozambique became independent in 1975. The division between these parties was primarily regional-with Frelimo being mainly a Southern party and Renamo for the most part representing the Centre. The North was divided between the two. This regional division also reflected ethnic divisions-Frelimo was supported by the Xitsonga (accounting for 24.1 per cent of Mozambique population) from the Southern region, and Renamo had Cisena (27 per cent of the population) and Ndau support from the central region-indeed Frelimo has been described as an 'Ndau project'. A UNnegotiated peace agreement ended the fighting in 1992, and multiparty general elections followed in 1994 and 1999-in a first past the post-system Frelimo won each election easily.
Although the civil war had strong ideological elements and was also due to extensive external intervention, 'ethnicity, particularly the perceived dominance of state power by southerners' played an important role in shaping Mozambique's civil conflict'. (Manning 2002: 44) . The coincidence of pre-existing regional disparities in economic development, Frelimo's tendency to place government officials in positions away from their home areas (and especially to put southerners in positions of authority in the center and the north), along with the disastrous social and economic consequences of the combination of instantaneous decolonization and transformative socioeconomic policy, made for a readily mobilizable constituency with common problems that displaced Frelimo former leaders could link to ethno-regional bias (Manning 2002: 85) .
The conflict, therefore, was able to capitalize 'on existing grievances within Mozambique. Foremost among these were a sense of ethnic and regional domination (by southern groups against the center and center-north)' (Manning 2002: 38) . Economic and social horizontal inequalities in Mozambique-whether expressed in ethnic or regional terms-had been entrenched during the colonial period, and were evident in the immediate post-war situation. In Table 3 , these HIs are estimated by the ratios of Xitsonga to Cisena resources and consumption. As can be seen Xitsonga (southerners) consistently outperform Xistongas from the centre.
Post-conflict political divisions continued to reflect the war-time divisions, albeit in a peaceful electoral way. Political support for the two parties has consistently followed regional lines. In 1994, each party polled over 75 per cent of their votes in heartland areas. The Frelimo government is supported by the south and part of the north. and the opposition leadership comes mainly from the centre and the north.
The post-conflict political system involves a directly elected president, with considerable powers, including the appointment of the cabinet. The legislature is elected by proportional representation-this is nonetheless dominated by Frelimo who get support from more than half the population. To the extent that that support remains solid because of the way ethnic groupings vote, Renamo and its supporters will continue to lack power. The Frelimo government has used its position to monopolize formal power: for example, the power of traditional leaders, who tend to support Renamo, has been sharply reduced. The President refused to appoint Renamo nominated governors for central provinces which Renamo had won electorally both in 1994 and 1999. As a Frelimo party leader noted, 'The leadership of the government was with people from the south…' (quoted in Manning 2002: 47) . The situation is reflected in complaints from Renamo supporter that Nampula was neglected: 'it is a superiority complex of the south over the north ' (quoted in Manning 2002: 34) 'what we want is that tribalism, humiliation and segregation of our people … be stopped'.
In the post-conflict era, both political and economic/social HIs continued, with no attempts to correct them which may partly reflect this political domination, although aid-donors have huge power accounting for three-quarters of government expenditure.
Post-conflict reconstruction policies included the adoption of IFI-sponsored structural adjustment programmes and considerable amounts of bi-and multilateral aid to support reconstruction (see Brück 2001; Addison 2003 ). HIs were not considered explicitly in these policies.
The regional distribution of post-war expenditure gives an indication of whether HIs were taken into account in post-conflict policies. A systematic bias favouring the South can be observed (Table 5 ). Southern households received considerably above average infrastructural benefits of every kind, and the centre did worst, apart from school building where it did a better than the north. Data for aid distribution (which financed much of this infrastructure) also showed a strong bias towards the south. 1997. Average per capita aid disbursements for 1995-97 were US$18.5 in the north, US$71.87 in the centre and US$103.98 in the south (UNDP 1998). One estimate suggests that the centre received just 66 per cent of the average benefits from health and education (1996-97), the north 71 per cent, the south excluding Maputo 89 per cent and Maputo 533 per cent (Helberg et al. 2004 ). This seems to have continued, with the north and the south expanding their overall share of executed provincial expenditure according to the 2003 PRSP. There was also an imbalance in growth rates, as shown in Table 6 . The Mozambique case shows how little HIs are taken into account in current reconstruction efforts-in this case, either with respect to politics or economic and social reconstruction. Despite this there has been little threat of the resumption of war, although there have been occasional clashes (such as in November 2000). This is probably for several reasons. First, despite imbalances high growth rates were recorded in all areas, and all areas enjoyed improved infrastructure. Hence the imbalances were less provocative than they would have been in a context of economic stagnation. Second, external support for conflict disappeared. And third, it seems that some elite bargaining takes place in private providing economic opportunities to the leaders of the otherwise powerless opposition. 11 Nonetheless, continued political and economic HIs may threaten future stability, particularly if the economic success comes to an end.
Post-conflict in Guatemala 12
In Guatemala, sharp HIs have long been evident between indigenous peoples and the European and mixed population, and were an important element in provoking and sustaining the long civil war in Guatemala. Indigenous people account for at least 43 per cent of the population, but boundaries are uncertain and other estimates are higher. Large HIs emerged historically from the colonial experience, and have endured; e.g., for literacy, 1989, the indigenous rate was 10.2 per cent, and the non-indigenous, 76 per cent. According to a UNDP study of Guatemala, there are significant disparities in levels of development between the country's 22 administrative departments with the departments, where most of the country's Maya indigenous population is concentrated, all in the low human development (HDI under 0.500) category, while Guatemala City, where non-indigenous people are concentrated, is in the high human development category. Over three-quarters of the indigenous people live in poverty compared with 41 per cent of the non-indigenous; indigenous people account for 58 per cent of the poor and 72 per cent of the extreme poor. Inequality in land ownership is extreme (Figure 7 ). In 1979, 2.1 per cent of holdings accounted for 64.5 per cent of the agrarian land (a worsening compared with the 1950s). These economic inequalities were accompanied by extreme political inequalities with power concentrated in the hands of the nonindigenous population.
The historical causes of the long civil war relate to the 'exclusionary, racist, authoritarian and centralist characteristics of the state, economy and Guatemalan society' (CEH 1999: 81, quoted in Caumartin) . In a coup in 1954 a reformist regime was overthrown (with the support of the US, sections of the military and the elite). Subsequently, guerrilla resistance to the new regime emerged, led by non-indigenous rebel soldiers. The initial movement was rapidly suppressed, but new ones emerged, mostly with non-indigenous leadership, but with strong indigenous support. There followed a brutal campaign of state terror, with indigenous people being the main victims. Six hundred and twenty-two separate massacres were recorded by the UN sponsored truth commission. The war finally came to an end through a negotiated peace agreement between the government and the guerrilla umbrella movement. It was negotiated over nine years in three rounds of talks, ending in 1996. Altogether 17 separate accords were agreed. Of these, the first six were mainly concerned with procedures for securing peace; subsequently, there were three agreements on human rights, one specifically related to indigenous peoples and one establishing a commission to investigate human rights abuses; two of the agreements concerned socioeconomic issues, one related to resettlement and one to the agrarian question; the remainder covered constitutional issues and peace-making.
From our perspective the two most relevant accords are the Agreement on the SocioEconomic aspects and the Agrarian situation and the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIRI). The main provisions of the first were to increase tax revenue in order to support increased social expenditure; to introduce a register for land tenure and a trust fund to buy underused land for redistribution to tenant farmers; and conflict resolution mechanisms for land disputes. Each of these provisions in principle should help correct HIs, the first HIs in public entitlements to social services, and the second in land-both very serious aspects of HIs and exclusion in Guatemala.
The AIRI also potentially involved substantial correction of HIs (including cultural aspects). It included recognition of the identity of indigenous peoples, elimination of discrimination against them and the guarantee of the cultural, civil, political and social and economic rights of indigenous peoples. There was a commitment to ratify the ILO convention 169, the most extensive international convention for the protection of indigenous peoples rights; and the establishment of several joint commissions (of government and indigenous representatives) to develop specific proposals. These commissions include educational reform and cultural diversity, making indigenous languages official, protecting indigenous religious sites, political reform, participation and culture , indigenous women, indigenous peoples' land rights and customary law. As Caumartin notes, 'if adequately implemented, the AIRI provide the blueprint for a radical transformation of the Guatemalan state as well as a new starting point for interethnic relations ' (2004: 58) .
Nonetheless, many considered the agreement did not go far enough in this direction. However, its implementation proved even weaker. A political campaign against the agreements developed among conservative forces, with strong media support. It was argued that the agreement had been 'forced' on Guatemala by external forces. A referendum on the agreements was held in 1998. The 'no' campaign argued that approval would 'convert Guatemala into an indigenous state, marginalising the nonindigenous', that 'citizens would be divided and that the indigenous would possess more rights than other citizens' (Liga-Pro Patria leaflet cited in Caumartin 2004: 62); that non indigenous would lose their jobs; and that Guatemala might become 'balkanized'. In the referendum, the 'nos' won by 55 per cent to 45 per cent on a poll of only 18.6 per cent of the electorate. A breakdown of voting patterns shows that indigenous districts voted overwhelmingly in favour, and non-indigenous ones against (Jonas 2000) .
Subsequently, according to Caumartin 'most accords bar those that dealt with the strict mechanics of the cease fire have either floundered or been subjected to substantial delays during the implementation phase. Key sections … are currently in limbo (agrarian issues, indigenous rights, the redefinition of the mandate of the armed forces and the overhaul of the tax system) ' (2004: 63-64) . A record of peace-monitoring indicators shows some progress, but many targets have not been met (Table 7) .
While progress has been made on education (spending and outcomes), tax revenue has risen less than targeted and so has GDP, so that government revenue is well below that targeted. Health expenditure has risen less than targeted and health outcomes are substantially below target. Overall, however, government expenditure on human development has risen from 3. The Guatemalan case is very different from that of Mozambique. In the Guatemalan case, atypically, some of the deep problems related to HIs were included in the initial agreements. Even so if the agreements were fully to tackle HIs they would have needed to be interpreted with progressive imagination and determination. In the event, however, strong political resistance, and apathetic efforts on the part of the government meant that progress was mixed, although probably sufficient to prevent conflict breaking out again on the part of the indigenous community. Since much of the responsibility for the conflict was in fact that of the elite/military in their vicious attacks on the indigenous communities, ironically the rather limited progress towards improving HIs may in fact have contributed to peace, by giving this elite little grounds for overturning the government as they had done before. 
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed policies appropriate for correcting HIs in post-conflict countries. It has emphasized that policies need to correct political as well as economic and social HIs, although which policies are appropriate depends on the context. In general, policies to correct economic and political HIs do not seem to feature in most post-conflict policy recommendations, nor in practice. It must be re-emphasized that these are not the only policies needed. Policies to assist the resumption of economic growth and the reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure are also needed as well as policies to promote demobilization. Particular emphasis is needed on promoting unskilled employment, since lack of employment among young men is a common feature of conflict economies, a factor which predisposes to conflict.
I would conclude with three cautions. The first is the often argued point that affirmative actions tend to 'entrench' ethnicity. It should be pointed out that this is most likely to be a feature of policies involving targets and quotas, not those related to process and Human Rights, so this is an argument for prime emphasis on the latter type of policies. But there are places where HIs are so deep that more positive policies involving targets etc. are required. In practice, such policies are generally required in situations where are ethnicities are already entrenched. If accompanied by cultural and educational policies to promote multiethnic cohesion, they need not entrench ethnic consciousness further than it is already. In Malaysia, for example, while it has been argued that ethnicity has been entrenched by the policies, inter-marriage has remained high and collaborative ventures across ethnic lines have increased. In Malaysia, also the policies are being phased out as it is considered that their major objectives have been achieved. Continuous review and a time limited approach is generally desirable. The second caution is that in certain circumstances the policies themselves may provoke violence. Indeed, it has been argued that this was the case in Sri Lanka. Colonial preferences had given the minority Tamil community disproportionate presence in government and higher education. To counter this, the Sinhalese majority introduced some severe measures to reverse the position, including making Sinhalese the national language and that of government, and introducing strict quotas on university entrance. There were also discriminatory land policies. These measures had the effect of reversing the previous dominance of Tamils in government and substantially reducing their advantages in the universities (see Figure 8) . High levels of unemployment among the educated youth, virtually no prospect of political power in a majoritarian system (even with proportional representation which was eventually introduced) provided an incentive for young educated Tamils to lead a violent separatist rebellion (Sriskandarajah 2000) .
The case powerfully shows the need to be cautious in introducing policies to correct HIs so as not to provoke violent reaction from those who are losing some privileges. However, in this case, other factors were also present-including provocative language policies and high levels of unemployment among educated youths. Elsewhere inequalities have been moderated if not reversed without provoking violent reaction (e.g., in Trinidad and Tobago) 13 in addition to the cases of Northern Ireland and Malaysia mentioned above.
The third caution is illustrated by the example of Guatemala. Where the privileged dominate the political system, they may not be willing to implement corrective policies, whatever the international pressure to do so. In such situations, there is little the international community can do, other than through their own aid budgets. The implication again is that action to correct political HIs may need to precede economic action-but of course this is easier to say than to do, though when conflicts come to an end the peace negotiations provide an occasion in which comprehensive political participation and economic balance can and should be discussed.
While then policies to correct HIs may meet difficulties, the more the consideration of group inequality becomes part of the norms of policy-making in peace-time as well as post-conflict situations, the more likely that action towards HIs will become part of routine policy-making as well as in the post-conflict situation. 
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